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(Addressed to DDCI)

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Executive Secretary

6/24/83

Date

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

Executive Registry

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June 16, 1983

TO: The Secretary  
THROUGH: P - Mr. Eagleburger  
FROM: S/P - Stephen Bosworth *JB*  
SUBJECT: Soviet Responses to INF Deployment

The attached paper, prepared by us at Larry's request, examines how the Soviets are likely to respond once INF deployments begin. It is a comparatively long piece, but I believe you will find it useful not only for thinking about INF itself but for weighing the Soviet-American relationship as a whole.

In the course of preparing the paper, we uncovered some disagreement among bureaus. S/P believes that Soviet calculations will be strongly influenced by the need to avoid appearing to acquiesce in deployments; from this standpoint, discontinuity in East-West relations (falling short of acute crisis) could seem to serve Soviet interests. EUR and INR, whose views are set out in a separate section, feel Soviet purposes will be best served by continuity, to avoid raising the political stakes when the odds are against them, and to avoid undercutting the European peace movement.

The last section of the paper reviews the policy implications of our analysis.

Attachment: As stated

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SOVIET RESPONSES TO INF DEPLOYMENT

The onset of INF deployments in Europe at the end of this year will represent one of the most significant setbacks for Soviet foreign policy in recent years. Continued deployments would magnify this defeat. Between now and December, therefore, the Soviet leadership will make a major effort to prevent the implementation of NATO's dual decision. As it becomes clear that this effort will fail (as now seems likely), the Soviets will have to put in place a set of military and political countermeasures designed to offset and, if possible, to reverse US deployments.

This paper provides S/P's preliminary analysis of possible Soviet actions, the strategic calculations that will underlie the choices made, and their implications for US policy. The views of EUR and INR, where they diverge, are provided at the conclusion of this analysis. S/P and EUR are in basic agreement on the concluding section on policy implications.

Pre-Deployment Tactics

Andropov's most recent proposal almost certainly does not represent Moscow's last predeployment offer. As the date for initial deployments draws closer, Moscow is likely to present a "final" offer in a last-ditch effort to win a postponement of deployments. Furthermore, it may well signal its intentions in the relatively near future. It would not be at all surprising if Chancellor Kohl were presented with a new negotiating formula during his July visit to Moscow; the Soviets might also make a direct, high-level approach to us.

It is conceivable, but highly unlikely, that the Soviets will make an offer before December that would legitimate US deployments on a reduced scale, even one that banned Pershing II in exchange for limited GLCM numbers. To make such a fundamental concession would undercut the opposition to deployments which Moscow has so assiduously cultivated, and which the Soviets apparently view as a political force that can work to the USSR's advantage on other issues. Such a concession might occur after deployments have begun, but even then the Soviets may insist that the terms of the negotiations be altered so that new Soviet systems were permitted as part of any package legitimating new US deployments.

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The most forthcoming offer likely before the turn of the year would be one which continued to exclude any US deployments but provided for some combination of deep cuts in SS-20s in Europe and proposals to negotiate INF levels in the Far East. To make this offer more attractive, the Soviets might supplement it by commitments to destroy those SS-20s withdrawn from Europe, and by softening their demands on the inclusion of INF aircraft. By showing flexibility on SS-20 levels, global limits, and perhaps aircraft, the Soviets would be singling out the question of British and French systems -- a move calculated to sow divisions among the West Europeans on this issue, while placing the onus on the US for any failure to reach agreement in Geneva. Whatever the details, Moscow's purpose would be to create the impression of a final, take-it-or-leave-it offer which could be withdrawn if deployments proceeded on schedule.

While presenting a more inviting negotiating package, the Soviets may at the same time become more threatening. They are likely to be increasingly explicit about their intended counter-measures, may begin conspicuous preparations for "retaliation," and could even implement some of these measures as warnings. Kohl's Moscow reception in particular should involve both inducements and increased threats. Both on the soft side and the hard side, the Soviets will work on four tracks -- with us, with our domestic critics, with allied governments, and with the European peace movement (conceivably including violent, and even terrorist elements).

#### Post-Deployment Approach

We do not believe that the Soviets will feel so threatened by the onset of INF deployments that they will begin to negotiate on anything approximating our terms. On the contrary, they will almost certainly view any near-term negotiating concessions as an unacceptable sign of weakness and may well prefer to suspend negotiations altogether, at least temporarily. Whether or not they remain at Geneva, we expect them to respond to deployments in a way that underscores their unwillingness to acquiesce in a pro-Western shift in the East-West military balance.

In addition to the military counter-deployments implied by this concern, the Soviets will also have to select an accompanying political and diplomatic strategy. In simplest terms, they will have to choose between, on the one hand, measures that heighten international tensions so as to convince the West that military competition with the USSR is dangerous as well as futile, and, on the other hand, an approach that downplays the significance of the INF defeat and emphasizes Soviet reasonableness so as to divide the US from its allies.

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The Soviet leadership will doubtless debate whether political escalation will merely play into the hands of Western "hawks," by strengthening the case for continued (or accelerated) INF deployments and more extensive mobilization to meet "the Soviet threat." (It may also be argued that even in military terms the Soviet Union could satisfactorily "match" Western actions by announcing steps to be implemented only at some future date.) The point may be made that the start of deployment will not by any means make its completion inevitable; that P-II deployments in the FRG will take two years, and GLCM five years, to complete; and that in this interval Soviet interests would best be served by widening the gap between European and American perspectives. Such efforts will offer hope not only that INF deployments can be reversed or curtailed, but that NATO unity on many other issues can be undermined. In this light, it may seem foolhardy to risk galvanizing US and European opinion merely to demonstrate Soviet displeasure.

The case for a "minimalist" course will, however, be severely handicapped by the fact that Soviet policies now being followed will by then have failed to prevent deployment. European and American differences will, by then, seem an increasingly weak reed, and "minimalism" (in both political and military senses) will seem to be a policy of "business-as-usual". For these reasons, the initiation of deployments will appear to require an extra effort to keep the INF issue from seeming closed. By contrast, a low-key Soviet response that does not substantially increase East-West tensions may signal acquiescence.

If the Soviets have waged an active campaign between now and December to show flexibility and reasonableness, they may feel that they have freed themselves from blame for increased tensions. It may be argued in support of a higher-tension strategy that a major point of the 1983 peace offensive was to assure that the US would be blamed when the Soviets retaliate in 1984. If so, the question of blame may seem less important than the question of fear; only increased tensions may by 1984 seem adequate to divide the West on the issue of continuing deployments.

If these arguments are accepted even in part, they will tend to tip the policy balance in favor of a tougher response. The Soviets would then react strongly, and promptly, to initial deployments -- not because, with a mere handful of US systems deployed, they felt the game was over, but because a strong and prompt response would seem their best and only hope of keeping the game from being over and of preventing the "recoupling" of Europe and the US.

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Military Countermeasures

Whichever of these general perspectives prevails, the Soviet response to INF deployments will include some military counterdeployments. This is virtually guaranteed by the fact that both Andropov and Gromyko have recently put their credibility -- abroad and quite possibly at home -- on the line by publicly reiterating earlier Soviet threats to retaliate in kind against both Western Europe and the U.S. The authoritative May 28 statement of the Soviet government underscored the seriousness of Moscow's view.

In Europe: In all likelihood, the primary focus of Soviet military countermeasures against Pershing II and GLCM will be Europe. Multiple considerations favor this focus: political (Europe as the weaker link of the alliance), military (more relevant to the Soviets' warfighting capability, and logistically more attractive), legal (no repudiation of existing agreements like SALT II or the 1962 Cuba settlement), and bargaining (European deployments fit better with the Soviet opposition to global limits). In addition, the risks created by measures directed against Europe will seem lower and more manageable.

Among the steps taken -- or announced -- by the Soviets in the months following the start of US deployments, some would probably have been taken by Moscow in any case (the weapons involved have been in the pipeline for several years), but the arrival of new US INF will provide the Soviets with a convenient justification to move ahead with deployments:

-- Announcement of the end of the Soviet "moratorium" on European SS-20 deployments (this was explicitly threatened in the May 28 statement, and might be coupled with an offer to reinstate the moratorium if US deployments are suspended);

-- Resumption of new SS-20 base construction in the Western USSR (this step may be less likely in the near term because the Soviets appear to have completed their intended program and might see greater military value in devoting available resources to strengthening their shorter-range INF capability);

-- Deployment of SS-21s and SS-23s in Eastern Europe to replace or augment Frog and Scud missiles;

-- Deployment of a Soviet long-range GLCM as the most obvious tit-for-tat measure;

-- Modernization and increases in the numbers of Soviet tactical nuclear aircraft, and in Soviet defenses against US INF systems;

-- Announcement that nuclear warheads for Soviet shorter-range INF systems will henceforth be based with the systems in Eastern Europe (which would simply make public a reality of long standing).

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An additional step which the Soviets might take would be the forward deployment in peacetime of 950-km SS-12 and SS-22 missiles to the GDR (this may have been the intended implication of the May 28 Government Statement's reference to countermeasures taken in concert with Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies). This step would eliminate the time needed to move these missiles forward in a crisis. It could give new force to the arguments of anti-INF forces in Europe that US deployments will increase rather than reduce the Soviet nuclear threat to Western Europe.

Against the US: Although Europe will be the prime Soviet target, measures that target the US will also be needed to substantiate repeated Soviet warnings. Most of the available options, however, have important drawbacks.

-- Unless the Soviet leadership wants a full-blown confrontation with the US, emplacement of INF systems in Cuba will seem too dangerous a step, one that would almost completely dwarf the European INF issue. Recent statements of Soviet officials suggest their growing caution on this score. Missiles or bombers based in Nicaragua would also cross the threshold from controlled escalation to outright confrontation.

-- The Soviets will consider other deployments in this hemisphere, such as close-in, SLCM-armed submarine or surface-ship deployments, perhaps with increased portcalls in Cuba; stepped-up bomber patrols, with the new Soviet ALCM; an upgraded presence in Grenada, etc. These are likely to seem less provocative, but at the same time less effective, either as means of pressure or as bargaining counters against INF.

Deploying SS-20's to new Far Eastern sites from which they can cover more US targets would have the advantage of requiring no stationing of nuclear systems outside the USSR and no abrogation of existing arms-control agreements. In addition to the drawbacks of adverse terrain and climate, however, it would complicate Soviet positions in both INF (by demonstrating the need for global limits) and START (by enlarging the SS-20's "strategic" capability). This step will be most likely if, as they have sometimes hinted, the Soviets conclude that the two forums should be merged; they might consider this a convenient way to resume negotiations after an early 1984 walkout from the talks.

Whatever the drawbacks of individual options, the Soviets will certainly feel that some countermeasures must be put in place against the US. In selecting these, the Soviets are likely to avoid extreme steps that would stimulate an acute Soviet-American crisis. Yet even the low-risk measures selected by the Soviets could, in combination with counterdeployments against Europe, create an atmosphere of considerably higher tension than in recent years.

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A last military measure, which has already been threatened by Soviet spokesmen, would be to declare that Soviet missile forces have been shifted to a launch-on-warning posture. While we believe that the Soviets will respond to INF primarily by counterdeployments rather than by adjustments in operating doctrines, such a step would certainly feed public fears, in both Europe and the US, that the superpower balance is becoming intolerably precarious.

### Political and Diplomatic Tactics

The specific military countermeasures selected by the Soviets will help to set the political temperature of the INF issue: some will seem much more provocative and dangerous -- and a more decisive historical break -- than others. Yet even (and perhaps particularly) if the Soviets select a very restrained and careful course, including only the most minimal military steps to preserve their credibility, they may augment these with political and diplomatic moves whose purpose would be to keep the confrontation heated.

The Soviets are, for example, likely to make some manipulative use of their participation in the INF talks, if only by delaying resumption of the negotiations for dramatic effect. They will surely declare that the basis for an agreement has been upset and, if they conclude that increased tensions will serve their interests, are likely to walk out of the talks altogether. Whether this would also include a boycott of START, MBFR, CDE (if convened by then) or other negotiating forums is uncertain, although the effect of multiple walk-outs would serve the aim of spreading a sense of latent panic in Europe. The Soviets would have to weigh the danger that such abrupt actions will also tend to ease pressures on Washington, not only to reconsider INF deployments but to keep observing SALT limits. If it can make clear that the US is responsible, Moscow will want Western European governments and publics to consider the possibility that East-West communication will simply break down. Soviet experience with the peace movement to date suggests that the absence of negotiation can significantly inflame such fears.

These reasons should assure that a walkout from several forums at once will at least be considered. The Soviets are likely to feel that going still further, perhaps to repudiate SALT II outright, might begin to overplay their hand, but this could be a close call. Piecemeal repudiation, e.g., by initiating depressed-trajectory SLCM tests, could serve the same purpose less provocatively, and leave room for repudiation of other SALT limits later on.

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If the Soviets pursue a policy of increasing European anxieties, their other measures would focus on the most sensitive pressure point, i.e., relations between the two Germanies, possibly including Berlin. Actions of this sort would be a reminder of how much Germany's residual benefits from Ostpolitik are dependent on Soviet goodwill. Moscow also could manipulate German emigration from the USSR -- whether by outright curtailment or an offer of substantial increases. Such steps would have the drawback of shifting the ground of the East-West confrontation not only from INF but from nuclear issues altogether; the Soviets will again have to worry that in widening the issue, they -- rather than the US -- will be blamed for increased tensions.

To be successful Soviet policies have to avoid provoking the broader anti-Soviet German backlash that high pressure on Berlin could stimulate. This constraint will probably rule out major new pressure, but not necessarily less extreme political measures and lower levels of harassment (like the recent Berlin air-corridor closing). These are likely to seem less risky, and more usable as a supplement to the Soviet military response. (Some Soviet diplomats, for example, have begun observing that the "situation in Berlin will suffer" if deployments proceed). Curbing inner-German human contacts, on whatever pretext, might also seem an effective lever. Growing FRG-GDR tension may mean that this gambit is already, at least tentatively, in use.

Looking toward Asia, the Soviets are likely to try to break down Western unity on global limits. Among the measures that might promote this goal are initiatives hinting at or proposing a separate INF track in the Far East. Such moves would, of course, be largely for show, since none of the affected parties -- Moscow included -- would want to hold such negotiations. Yet unless the Soviets can show progress on this score, the impact on Western unity may prove marginal, and other steps will have to be considered.

One further Soviet step might be to consider an East Asian INF moratorium (possibly even unilateral), which would have a much greater impact in Europe than a proposal merely to discuss missile limits. As to its impact in Asia, the Soviets might also begin to run through the full series of "initiatives" developed in the European context, right down to numerical arguments asserting an existing theater balance. This diplomatic approach would not be wholly new (Brezhnev alluded to possible Far East INF talks as early as May 1982), nor would it preclude a simultaneously more threatening posture, especially toward Japan.

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While some combination of the above measures is likely, we do not believe that the Soviets will go still further to initiate specific challenges to the West in the Third World, merely as extra retaliation on INF. For such Soviet opportunities are defined above all by local circumstances. Yet Soviet assessments of their opportunities could conceivably be affected at the margin. On any occasion where they face a choice between being more or less constructive, the Soviet leadership may lean toward even less cooperation with us. Central America, southern Africa, and the Middle East are the regions where such choices are most likely to arise. In some instances, Soviet policy may already have moved toward a somewhat more confrontational posture (e.g., the SA-5's in Syria, direct provision of helicopters to Nicaragua). The Yugoslav Foreign Minister has told us he believes that the onset of deployments will also relax inhibitions on the Soviets in Afghanistan. This trend toward increased militance could continue as the INF issue plays out. Over the longer term, however, a sharp and sustained increase in East-West tensions in Europe and a demonstration of sustained Western unity could serve to make the Soviets more risk-averse in the Third World.

#### The Longer Run

Whatever strategy governs the initial Soviet reaction to INF deployments, it is unlikely to be reexamined for some time thereafter. If arguments calling for a somewhat more confrontational Soviet response are persuasive in late 1983, they are also likely to be persuasive enough to keep this response in place at least for the better part of 1984. And even if a peace-offensive-as-usual strategy emerges, it is unlikely to yield satisfactory new Soviet offers at an early date. The Soviets will not want to confirm claims, now widely made in the West, that deployments will extract qualitatively better deals from them.

Neither a relatively hard nor a relatively soft Soviet response will, however, be immune to challenge within the Soviet leadership. Either strategy will be held up, above all, to the test of its evolving effects on Western policy.

If the Soviets have chosen a tough line, their reassessment will hinge on whether they believe that their initial response has:

-- Softened up Western governments for a new negotiating round in which we would move toward the Soviet position. Independent proposals by our allies to sacrifice Pershing might be such a sign.

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-- Begun to jeopardize the long-term value to Moscow of the peace movement and of radicalized, anti-NATO opposition parties. SPD movement back toward a more moderate and solidly pro-NATO stance would be such a warning.

-- Forced the Soviet Union to sacrifice other benefits of improved relations with the West. Indications of increased US interest in a START compromise would raise the cost to Moscow of continuing confrontation tactics.

-- Successfully taught our allies a lesson. The Soviets would want them to remember, for future decisions, that detente is dependent on European efforts to stem the US buildup and that failure to do so provokes protracted tensions.

If, on the other hand, at the outset of deployments the Soviets have chosen a much less confrontational response based on minimal military measures and low-key diplomacy, they will have to weigh constantly the evidence that by reacting too weakly they are allowing the INF question to be resolved against them. Especially if they believe that they are bolstering the President's re-election chances by a quiescent approach, they will have stronger incentives to break off the talks and perhaps even to create an atmosphere of confrontation. On the other hand, if the Soviets believe progress toward a mutually acceptable strategic arms agreement is possible, and/or that the President will be reelected, they may see 1984 as a time of maximum leverage for seeking a meaningful accommodation with the US.

Whatever the Soviet reassessment, a change of course need not occur on every front at once. A return to the INF negotiating table, designed to prevent an anti-Soviet closing of ranks in the West, for example, need not involve a new negotiating offer to break the stalemate. The Soviet decision will reflect some concerns unrelated to INF, such as the overall direction of Soviet-American relations, and precisely for this reason a change of policy may not improve the chances of resolving the INF issue itself. Similarly, Soviet proposals to merge the START and INF proposals need not indicate a fundamentally new position. Over the long run the Soviets may well want to negotiate a stabilized military relationship in Europe, and may eventually consider negotiating formulas allowing for some US deployments. Yet they are also likely to seek to structure the terms of the negotiations so that new Soviet systems (deployed in response to our GLCMs and P-II), rather than existing SS-20s alone, form the Soviet offset to new US missiles.

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EUR and INR Views

EUR and INR agree with S/P that the Soviets will almost certainly feel compelled to respond in kind with new INF deployments of their own, for both military and political reasons. These bureaus agree that the Soviet countermeasures are likely to center on additional INF deployments in Europe, together with steps to increase the sea-based threat to the continental US.

However, EUR and INR believe that the Soviets' political and diplomatic response will involve less discontinuity in established policies than S/P anticipates. Specifically, these bureaus do not believe that the initiation of INF deployments will trigger an early, appreciable, and enduring shift in Soviet foreign policy. Such a shift would simply highlight Soviet failure to block deployments and strengthen Western resolve to complete the process. Moreover, EUR and INR would emphasize that INF deployments will be only one determinant of Soviet behavior in 1984, and that other factors -- particularly the status of START and the prospects for the US elections -- will play an equal if not greater role in determining whether or not there will be a basic change in the direction of Soviet foreign policy after December.

In EUR and INR's view, changes in Soviet policy post-December will be tentative and evolutionary. The Soviets understand that the Pershing II deployments in the FRG will take two years to complete, and that GLCM deployments will continue until September 1988. While the Soviets are unlikely to believe that a continued "peace offensive" will succeed in reversing US deployments, they will view further political action as a more effective means of bringing about a negotiated outcome on terms favorable to Moscow than a shift toward a more confrontational approach to East-West issues.

While Moscow will make plain its anger, its response will continue along two tracks, not shift to a substantially more threatening approach. Although the USSR will want to emphasize that it is the US which is driving Europe into an increasingly dangerous arms race, it will also want to hold out the hope to the Europeans that they can still do something about it. EUR and INR believe that the Soviets will give more weight than that posited by S/P to the risks involved in escalating their threats to Western Europe. Such an approach could galvanize Europeans into greater defense-mindedness, and could well return the SPD, for example, to its native anti-communism.

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EUR and INR believe it especially unlikely that the Soviets would run the risks of exerting major new pressures on Berlin or escalating any current regional disputes, or that they would be significantly more inclined to exploit new opportunities that might present themselves in the Third World. Such moves would be inconsistent with the policy that EUR and INR foresee -- a continued peace offensive designed to put continuing pressure on the West to limit its military buildup, and to enter into arms control arrangements of benefit to Moscow. Moreover, a tougher Soviet stance could backfire by making certain the reelection of President Reagan and the discrediting of anti-INF peace groups in Western Europe.

EUR and INR believe that the Soviets will make their greatest post-December effort in Germany. Much as the Soviets may have regretted Kohl's victory in the election, Moscow can already note that the SPD in opposition is tending to move leftward. The Soviets will want both to cultivate SPD leaders and to maintain an effective relationship with the Kohl government. Moscow will consequently continue to tailor some of its appeals for detente to specific German concerns. It will probably encourage East Germany to make small concessions to promote ties with the FRG and thus to remind West Germans of their abiding personal interest in such benefits of detente as family visits. The Soviets will probably even hint privately that reunification might be exchanged for neutralization of Germany. Moscow would probably neither expect a West German acceptance of such a proposition nor be willing to follow through if there were one, but would float it in order to exploit an issue of enormous popular resonance to Germans East and West.

EUR and INR also consider it unlikely that the Soviets would suspend negotiations with the US on INF, although they might delay resumption of the talks for dramatic effect. Gromyko's April 2 press conference and Andropov's Spiegel interview reinforced this judgment (asked whether the USSR would break off the talks when deployment began, both declined to make a specific threat). The Soviets would want to adopt a pose of the aggrieved party which was still seeking to negotiate a fair agreement. Moreover, to the extent that INF and START are related, Moscow would be reluctant to break off part of the negotiating channel lest American willingness to maintain the current SALT I and II limits be diminished. At a minimum, even if the Soviets were to break off the separate INF channel, they would continue to seek limits on US LRINF in START, where they have already proposed constraints that repeat elements of their INF position.

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Any "latent panic" created in Europe by Moscow's walking out of any disarmament talks would probably work against Soviet interests, all the more so if it were clear that it was the USSR and not the US which was refusing to talk. Quite the contrary, Moscow will probably make a show of flexibility in fora where Europeans are directly engaged, calculating that there would be some impact on the INF debate. It is already doing this in MBFR and in CSCE/CDE.

### Implications

All bureaus, in sum, acknowledge the virtual certainty of military counterdeployments, but disagree over the political strategy that will accompany them. S/P believes that Soviet calculations will be strongly influenced by the need to avoid appearing to acquiesce in deployments; from this standpoint, discontinuity in East-West relations (falling short of acute crisis) could serve Soviet interests. EUR and INR feel that the Soviets are unlikely to change the character of their relations with Western Europe or the United States only -- or even principally -- as a function of INF deployments.

The certainty of counterdeployments and the likelihood of continuing stalemate in the Geneva INF talks have a number of implications for US policy. The possibility that Soviet responses will further aggravate East-West tensions must also be reflected in our planning.

#### 1. We need to begin to prepare for Soviet counter-deployments:

-- In our public statements, we must avoid any suggestion that we consider the new Soviet deployments a legitimate offset to our own INF deployments, and emphasize the fact that the new Soviet systems have actually been in the pipeline for many years (for example, in the case of the Soviet GLCM, development began even before the NATO 1979 decision).

-- Our direct communication with the Soviets should emphasize the fruitlessness and gravity of their counterdeployments. At the same time, we need to avoid feeding a perception in Western Europe that INF deployments are part of a spiraling arms race, generating Soviet counterdeployments against which further Western deployments will be needed.

#### 2. We need to structure the political and military environment to discourage or to limit Soviet countermeasures that aim to increase tensions:

-- The political costs of a confrontational Soviet line will be increased, perhaps most significantly, by making it as hard as possible for the Soviets to claim that they negotiated seriously before deployments began, or that the negotiating possibilities are exhausted.

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-- We can further raise the political costs, and possibly induce some Soviet hesitation, by showing how East-West relations could improve, if only the Soviets would act accordingly. Suggestions of flexibility in START might be somewhat effective here. Such an approach may also provide the best high ground on which to ride out the first phases of the INF confrontation while sustaining Western unity.

-- We should review the possibilities for our own "peace offensive"; over the next year we need to consider new proposals that emphasize our own commitment to reduce tensions while the Soviets are trying to keep fears and tensions high.

-- Because the Soviets may try to alter the entire INF framework by splitting our European and Asian allies, we need a thorough review of possible Soviet options (including proposals for separate Far East negotiations) and of US responses. At a minimum, our NATO allies must be much better sensitized to the potential pitfalls of separating the European and Asian theaters.

-- To develop a strategy to moderate the Soviet response, we have agreed with Larry Eagleburger that the IG on US-Soviet relations should undertake a more exhaustive study of the likely Soviet response and the instruments available to the US and our allies for affecting that response. This study will complement work underway in the INF IG on Soviet military responses.

### 3. We need to engage our allies more fully in post-deployment planning:

-- As our own analysis develops, we should begin soon to discuss our expectations with our allies. For both our public statements on INF and theirs should reflect our analysis of Soviet strategy; neither we nor they should promise our publics that deployment will make the Soviets negotiate seriously right away.

-- We must be careful, of course, not to present an alarmist assessment of the likelihood of reaching an INF agreement after December (or before December, for that matter). The President's low-key formula at Williamsburg is a good model: "If tensions rise, it is the Soviets who will be responsible."

-- Our principal message should be that, while unpleasant Soviet reactions are likely, these are in part predictable and, in any case, manageable. We should express confidence that, faced with Western resolve, and with Western willingness to negotiate, the Soviets will choose to engage in a serious dialogue rather than sustain dangerous new East-West confrontations.

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-- We should begin this post-deployment planning initially in the quadripartite format and among the five basing countries, and only later move the issue to the SCG.

4. We need to analyze thoroughly how all these considerations affect the timing of a Reagan-Andropov summit:

-- If held before deployment, for example, a summit might moderate Soviet retaliation by making it harder to show we had not negotiated in good faith; the meeting itself would, however, be relatively confrontational, since the Soviets could not afford to convey the impression that an accommodation with the US was possible on the eve of INF deployments. Alternatively, assuming progress can be made on other aspects of the US-Soviet agenda, a 1984 summit could aid an early deescalation of tensions.

-- Once deployments were underway, Soviet willingness to have a constructive summit would depend on other factors, as suggested above, including the status of the START negotiations and prospects for the US elections. In any case, we have to keep in mind the possibility that cancellation of a planned summit could be used by the Soviets as an instrument for undermining European support for deployments.

5. We need to review the possibilities of significantly more extreme Soviet countermeasures:

-- Out-of-area contingency planning (especially for this hemisphere) is needed; even if these are low probability scenarios, the dangers they would create merit priority attention.

-- Finally, because increased East-West tensions may spur violence in Western Europe, we should look at terrorist contingencies, on a very confidential basis, at first inside the USG before considering discussions with allies.

6. Finally, we need to review the opportunities that Soviet policies may create for us:

-- Soviet responses to deployment may be provocative enough to create new opportunities for our efforts at alliance management. As has sometimes happened in the past, Moscow's policy may promote a significant reassessment in European policy toward the Soviet Union -- led by the friendly allied governments now in power but having an effect across the political spectrum in each country. Similarly, burgeoning Soviet INF programs in Asia may strengthen our efforts at cooperation with China, Japan, and other Asian states. In both

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